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ABSTRACT
What are the constitutional limits on a state’s power to tax a trust with no connection to the state,
other than the accident that a potential beneficiary lives there? The Supreme Court of the United
States will take up this question this term in the context of North Carolina Department of Revenue v.
Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust. The case involves North Carolina’s income taxation of
a trust with a contingent beneficiary, meaning someone who is eligible, but not certain, to receive
a distribution or benefit from the trust, who resides in that state. Part I of this Article explains
the background of Kaestner Trust and frames the constitutional questions that will be before the
Court at oral arguments on April 16, 2019. Part II examines how and why due process applies
in the state income taxation context, with a particular emphasis on how familiar concepts of
general and specific jurisdiction apply uneasily to donative trusts. Part III articulates the reasons
that the Court should hold that a state has no constitutional authority to impose a tax on trust
income where the trust’s only connection with the forum state is the residence of a contingent
beneficiary. Kaestner Trust is the most important due process case involving trusts that the Court
has decided in over sixty years; it bears directly on the fundamental meaning of due process.
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Truth is stranger than fiction, but it is because Fiction is obliged to stick
to possibilities; Truth isn’t.
–Pudd’nhead Wilson’s New Calendar1

INTRODUCTION
Tic-tac-toe.2 Snap, crackle, pop.3 Larry, Curly, and Moe. 4 Peas porridge hot.5
Certain words seem to roll off the tongue naturally in threes. For some lawyers and
lucky individuals, this list of common verbal triads includes the words “grantor,
trustee, and beneficiary.” In the most general sense, a trust is a beneficial
arrangement in which a grantor transfers assets to a trustee for the benefit of one or
more beneficiaries.6 In the case of a transfer to an irrevocable trust—one that the
grantor cannot change or undo—the grantor typically has no further control over
the trust property. The terms of the trust agreement dictate how the trust will
operate and specify which state’s law will govern the administration and
interpretation of the trust instrument.7 However, a trust’s governing law provision
is not outcome-determinative for income tax purposes. State X may choose to
impose a tax on a trust’s income if the trust is created under the will of a decedent
domiciled in that state, if the trust is administered in the state, if the trustee resides
in or does business in the state,8 if some or all of the trust assets are located in the

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

MARK TWAIN, FOLLOWING THE EQUATOR: A JOURNEY AROUND THE WORLD 156 (1897)
(epigraph to Chapter 15). Pudd’nhead Wilson is a fictional lawyer in a small town who
produces a calendar with idiosyncratic quotations; local townspeople consider him a
simpleton, or “pudd’nhead.” See MARK TWAIN, PUDD’NHEAD WILSON AND THOSE
EXTRAORDINARY TWINS (1894).
See, e.g., Klay Kruczek & Eric Sundberg, A Pairing Strategy for Tic-Tac-Toe on the
Integer Lattice With Numerous Directions, 15 ELECTRONIC J. COMBINATORICS 1 (2008).
See, e.g., Snap, Crackle & Pop, KELLOGG’S RICE KRISPIES, https://www.ricekrispies.
com/en_US/snap-crackle-pop.html [https://perma.cc/B4DP-FC8R] (dating first
appearance of the cereal advertising slogan to 1929).
See, e.g., Robert Gardner & Robert Davidson, Hypothesis Testing Using the Films of the
Three Stooges, 32 TEACHING STAT. 49 (2010).
See, e.g., FLORENCE WARREN BROWN & NEVA L. BOYD, OLD ENGLISH AND AMERICAN
GAMES FOR SCHOOL AND PLAYGROUND 44 (1915).
See, e.g., ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 385 (10th
ed. 2017).
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 107 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000) (providing that a trust’s
governing law is “the law of the jurisdiction designated in the terms unless the
designation of that jurisdiction’s law is contrary to a strong public policy of the
jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to the matter at issue”).
This is the approach taken by New York, for example. See N.Y. TAX LAW
§ 605(b)(3)(D) (McKinney 2018) (imposing no tax on a trust if no trustees are
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state, or if a trust beneficiary resides in the state.9 Alternately, State X may choose to
not tax the income at all. 10
Generally speaking, an irrevocable trust is taxed only once—as an entity. That
is, unless the grantor has retained certain powers over the trust property, the trust is
treated for income tax purposes as an entity separate from the person who created
it.11 The trustee will pay tax on any income the trust earns (or accrues) and
retains. 12 To the extent that the trustee distributes trust income out to a beneficiary,
the beneficiary will pay tax on that income and the trustee will not.13 Unique
challenges arise in taxing an irrevocable trust when the trust has significant
relationships with multiple jurisdictions, when the trust has any beneficiary with a
contingent interest, or when the trust has multiple beneficiaries in different
jurisdictions. For example, if a trust with a trustee domiciled in State X has
mandatory income beneficiaries located in State Y, it may be that the trust is subject
to income taxation in both State X and State Y.
While the Supreme Court of the United States has previously upheld the
constitutionality of multiple states’ imposing a wealth transfer tax on the same
item,14 it has yet to address a case in which two or more states seek to impose
income tax the same item of trust income. The Court also has not yet addressed the
constitutionality of imposing an income tax on a trust’s contingent beneficiary,
meaning someone who is eligible, but not certain, to receive a distribution or
benefit from the trust. In many modern trusts, the trustees have discretion—but no
obligation—to pay trust income or principal to a named beneficiary or a member of
a class of beneficiaries. Logically, if the trustee resides in State X, the trust assets are
located in State X, the trust’s situs is State X, and the contingent trust beneficiary,
although residing in State Y, never receives a distribution from the trust, one would
think that such State Y would not have sufficient minimum contacts to impose a tax

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

domiciled in that state, the trust has no source income from New York, and no trust
property is located in the state).
This is the approach taken by North Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia, and California. See
generally RICHARD W. NENNO, BASES OF STATE INCOME TAXATION OF NONGRANTOR
TRUSTS (2019).
This is the approach taken by Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas,
Washington, and Wyoming. See generally id.
But see 26 U.S.C. §§ 676, 677 (2012) (providing that where grantor of inter vivos trust
retains certain rights over trust property, such as the right to substitute trust property,
all items of trust income be treated as belonging to the grantor).
JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, WALTER HELLERSTEIN & JOHN A. SWAIN, STATE TAXATION
¶ 20.09 (3d ed. 2018).
Id.
Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 372 (1939) (permitting both Alabama and Tennessee to
impose tax on testamentary transfer of intangible property under will of Tennessee
domiciliary passing to trustee located in Alabama).

6
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on trust income that the beneficiary has not received and is not certain to receive at
any time in the future. The Supreme Court will now take up these questions in
North Carolina Department of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family
Trust.15 The Court will hear oral arguments on April 16, 2019, with a decision
expected sometime in June.16 Kaestner Trust is the most important due process
case involving trusts that the Court has decided in over sixty years.17
Part I of this Article explains the factual background and procedural posture
of the Kaestner Trust case and frames the constitutional questions that are before
the Court.18 Part II examines how and why due process applies in the state income
taxation context, with a particular focus on how the familiar concepts of general
and specific jurisdiction apply uneasily to donative trusts. Part III articulates the
reasons that the Court should hold that a state has no constitutional authority to
impose a tax on trust income where the trust’s only connection with the forum state
is the residence of a contingent beneficiary.

I.
A.

BACKGROUND: THE KIMBERLEY RICE KAESTNER 1992 FAMILY TRUST
The Long Path to the Supreme Court

On December 30, 1992, under a single umbrella irrevocable trust agreement,
Joseph Kee Rice III created three separate share trusts, with one for the benefit of
each of his three children and their descendants.19 The umbrella trust agreement
explicitly states that New York law governs the terms of each separate share trust.20
At the time of trust creation, both Mr. Rice and the initial trustee were
residents of and domiciled in New York.21 On the basis of the residence of the

15.
16.

17.

18.
19.

20.
21.

N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberly Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 915 (2019)
(mem.).
Supreme Court of the United States October Term 2019, [Monthly Argument Calendar] for
the Session Beginning April 15, 2019, https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments
/argument _calendars/MonthlyArgumentCalApril2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/253D-UZCY]
[hereinafter Monthly Argument Calendar].
The last significant trust case involving state due process claims was Hanson v. Denckla.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (holding that Florida, the state of the
decedent’s domicile, had no jurisdiction over Delaware trustees of a testamentary
trust).
See infra Part I.
Complaint ¶¶ 11–12, 14, 17, Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of
Revenue, 2015 WL 1880607 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Complaint]
(No. 12-CVS-8740), 2012 WL 12282023, aff’d, 789 S.E.2d 645 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016),
aff’d, 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 915 (2019) (mem.).
Complaint, supra note 19, ¶ 15.
Id. ¶ 13.
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trustee, the trust was subject to income taxation in the state of New York. 22 At that
time, no descendants of Mr. Rice were domiciled in or maintained a residence in
North Carolina.23 Some years later, in 1995, Mr. Rice moved to Florida.24 In 1997,
Kimberley Rice Kaestner, Mr. Rice’s daughter and a beneficiary of one of the
separate share trusts, moved to North Carolina. 25 She and her children
continuously resided in North Carolina throughout the tax years in question, 2005
to 2008.
Pursuant to the terms of the trust agreement, the trustee was to distribute all of
the separate share trust property to Kimberley Rice Kaestner upon her attaining the
age of forty on June 2, 2009. Prior to this time, however, neither Ms. Kaestner nor
any of her descendants were entitled to any income or principal from the trust. 26 In
fact, the trustee did not make any discretionary distributions from the trust.27
During this time, the trustee did, however, make loans from the trust in order to
allow Ms. Kaestner to make certain business investments and to cover a capital call
on a limited partnership interest held in another trust.28
North Carolina imposes an income tax on any trust for the benefit of a North
Carolina resident (as well as residents outside of North Carolina if certain other
conditions are met).29 North Carolina makes no distinction between beneficiaries
who actually receive trust income and beneficiaries who merely might (but do not
in fact) receive trust income.30 In other words, according to North Carolina, the
fact that a contingent income beneficiary resides in-state is sufficient for the trust to
become subject to state income tax, regardless of whether the discretionary income
beneficiary receives any distribution of income from a trust that otherwise has no
connection with North Carolina.
For the tax years 2005 through 2008 inclusive (before Ms. Kaestner’s fortieth
birthday), the trustee filed a fiduciary income tax return in North Carolina and paid

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. See also N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(b)(3)(D) (McKinney 2018) (imposing income tax
based on residence of trustee in New York).
Complaint, supra note 19, ¶ 12.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 17.
Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 2015 WL 1880607,
at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015) (No. 12-CVS-8740), aff’d, 789 S.E.2d 645 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2016), aff’d, 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 915 (2019) (mem.).
Complaint, supra note 19, ¶ 23.
Kaestner, 2015 WL 1880607, at *2.
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-160.2 (West 2017) (imposing tax on taxable income of
estates and trusts where beneficiary is North Carolina resident or, in the case of a
nonresident beneficiary, if trust income derives from North Carolina sources).
See id. (imposing tax on taxable income of estates and trusts based on beneficiary’s
residence in-state).
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tax on the accumulated and undistributed trust income. 31 In 2012, the trustee then
filed a refund claim for more than $1.3 million paid during those tax years.32
The trustee argued for a refund on two grounds. First, the trustee claimed that
the North Carolina tax statute is unconstitutional because it violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (and its state counterpart).33 Under
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,34
which, in 2012, was the most current guidance on the relationship between state
taxation and interstate commerce, the Due Process Clause requires (1) “some
definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and a person, property or
transaction it seeks to tax;” and (2) “that the income attributed to the state for tax
purposes . . . be rationally related to values connected with the taxing state.”35 The
trustee of the Kimberley Rice Kaestner Trust asserted that North Carolina lacked
minimum contacts with the trust.36 The trustee himself resided outside of North
Carolina, the trust property and the trust situs were located outside of the state,37
the trust assets had never been distributed to anyone located in North
Carolina, and the trustee had not done anything to “avail [the trust] of the
benefits and protections of North Carolina.” 38 Thus, the trustee argued,
North Carolina’s tax law clearly violated the Due Process Clause.39
The trustee’s second argument was that North Carolina’s tax law violates the
Commerce Clause of Article I of the U.S. Constitution. 40 The Commerce Clause
requires a substantial nexus between the taxed entity or person and the state, an
apportionment of the tax to the degree of activity connected to the state, a fair
relationship between the tax and the services provided by the state, as well as
nondiscrimination against interstate commerce.41 The Kaestner Trust trustee
claimed that North Carolina failed all of these requirements. Most importantly, the

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Complaint, supra note 19, ¶ 22.
Id. ¶¶ 24–25; Kaestner, 2015 WL 1880607, at *1.
Complaint, supra note 19, ¶¶ 5–6. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (limiting conditions in which states
may impose tax on interstate commerce).
Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N. Carolina Dep’t of Revenue, 2015 WL
1880607, at *4 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015) (No. 12-CVS-8740), aff’d, 789 S.E.2d 645
(N.C. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d, 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 915
(2019) (mem.).
Complaint, supra note 19, ¶¶ 37–38, 43.
Id. ¶ 37.
Id. ¶¶ 37–38.
Id. ¶¶ 36–40.
Id. ¶¶ 5–6. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (reserving to Congress the sole power to
regulate commerce among the states).
See, e.g., Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
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trustee asserted that North Carolina lacked a “substantial nexus” with the trust. 42
Furthermore, according to the trustee, any state income tax was not fairly
apportioned among the jurisdictions that did have a nexus with the trust, the North
Carolina income tax discriminated against interstate commerce, and the trust did
not receive services from the state in fair proportion to the tax the trust paid.43
Having attacked the North Carolina statute on these two constitutional bases,
the trustee then moved for summary judgment, which the Superior Court of North
Carolina, Wake County, granted.44 The trial court reasoned that summary
judgment was appropriate for two reasons. First, the trial court found that the
North Carolina law violated the Due Process Clause because the trustee had no
physical presence in the state, the trust had no assets located in the state, and there
was nothing to suggest that the trustee had ever attempted to avail the trust of any
benefit under North Carolina law. 45 Although the North Carolina Department of
Revenue opposed the motion by arguing that the trustee conducted activity in the
state by consulting with Ms. Kaestner from time to time, the court emphasized that
the trustee, and not Ms. Kaestner, had sole and absolute discretion over the trust
assets. 46 Even the loans by the trustee to Ms. Kaestner were not of the type of
“sufficient contact” or “purposeful” activity on the part the trust such that the
undistributed trust income could be subject to taxation under North Carolina
law.47 Therefore, the court found that the trust did not have the necessary
minimum contacts with North Carolina to satisfy the elements of due process.48
The trial court also analyzed the Commerce Clause claim, citing to Quill’s
requirement that a business have a physical presence in the jurisdiction for the
business to have the “substantial nexus” with the state as required by the Commerce
Clause.49 The trial court found that North Carolina lacked a substantial nexus with

42.
43.
44.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Complaint, supra note 19, ¶ 43.
Id. ¶ 42. The trustee also asserted related violation of the North Carolina State
Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 46–49.
Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 2015 WL 1880607,
at *12 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015) (No. 12-CVS-8740), aff’d, 789 S.E.2d 645 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2016), aff’d, 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 915 (2019)
(mem.).
Id. at *5.
Id. at *6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *9. See also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (limiting conditions
in which states may impose tax on interstate commerce).
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the trust and that the state’s income tax was not “fairly related” to the services
provided to the trust. 50
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed the lower court’s
grant of the trustee’s motion for summary judgment. 51 Applying the standard that
a North Carolina court may only declare a law unconstitutional when the violation
is “plain and clear,” meaning its unconstitutionality “is demonstrated beyond a
reasonable doubt,” the Court of Appeals found that the trust lacked the minimum
contacts with North Carolina to make it subject to the state’s tax laws.52 Because the
Court of Appeals found that the North Carolina law did not meet the requirements
of due process, it declined to address the constitutionality of the tax under the
Commerce Clause.53
Still not deterred, the North Carolina Department of Revenue appealed its
case to the North Carolina Supreme Court.54 The state’s highest court affirmed the
lower courts’ grant and affirmation of summary judgment for the trustee, finding
that North Carolina did not have minimum contacts with the trust.55 The North
Carolina Department of Revenue then petitioned the Supreme Court of the United
States for a writ of certiorari.56 North Carolina cited a split between four state
courts that have held that in-state residence of a trust beneficiary is a sufficient basis
on which a state may impose income tax on a trust, and five state courts that have
held that such taxes violate the Due Process Clause. 57 The Supreme Court granted
the petition.58 The Court will hear oral arguments on April 16, 2019.59 A decision
is likely by the end of June, 2019.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

58.

Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 2015 WL 1880607,
at *9 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015) (No. 12-CVS-8740), aff’d, 789 S.E.2d 645 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2016), aff’d, 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 915 (2019) (mem.).
Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 789 S.E.2d 645
(N.C. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d, 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 915
(2019) (mem.).
Id. at 648–51.
Id. at 651.
Id.
Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C.
2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 915 (2019) (mem.).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t
of Revenue, 2015 WL 1880607 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015) (No. 12-CVS-8740)
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992
Family Tr., 2018 WL 4942045 at *9 (2018) (No. 18-457) (noting a conflict between, on
the one hand, courts in the four states of California, Missouri, Connecticut, and Illinois
that permit taxation of trusts based on a contingent beneficiary’s in-state residency,
and, on the other hand, courts in the five states of New York, New Jersey, Michigan,
Minnesota, and North Carolina that prohibit states from taxing trusts based on a
contingent beneficiary’s in-state residence).
N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 915
(2019) (mem.).
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The Major Tax Issue Before the Supreme Court of the United States

The question that the Supreme Court will address in Kaestner Trust is what
constitutes sufficient “minimum contacts” between a trust and a jurisdiction for tax
purposes. Constitutionally permissible bases for trust taxation may include that the
trust is created under the will of a decedent domiciled in that state, that the trust is
administered in or has assets located in the state, that the trustee resides in or
conducts trust business in the state, or that a beneficiary resides in the state.60 But
where the trustee does not actually distribute any trust property to a contingent
beneficiary, it is not obvious that the beneficiary’s residence alone constitutes a
sufficient connection to pass constitutional muster. The Court will address the
question under a due process framework, not under the Commerce Clause,
because neither the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court of North Carolina
reached the Commerce Clause question in Kaestner Trust.61 Furthermore, the
trustee seems to have abandoned this line of argument after the state appellate court
failed to address it.62
In evaluating Kaestner Trust, commentators may be tempted to refer to the
Supreme Court’s ruling in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,63 issued shortly after the
North Carolina Supreme Court in 2018 struck down as unconstitutional the state
income tax on a trust with a North Carolina contingent beneficiary. The Wayfair
decision partially overruled the Court’s earlier judgment in Quill, and held
that under the Commerce Clause, a state could impose a sales tax on a retailer
that lacked a traditional physical presence in the jurisdiction.64 Because the
Wayfair decision rested entirely on Commerce Clause grounds, 65 its tolerance for
taxation in the absence of a taxpayer’s lack of physical presence in the jurisdiction

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

65.

Monthly Argument Calendar, supra note 16.
See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 789 S.E.2d
645 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d, 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 915
(2019) (mem.).
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). The Wayfair Court upheld the
South Dakota law against a Commerce Clause challenge and overruled Quill in part.
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2080. In Wayfair, the Court ruled that laws imposing state sales
tax on nonresident sellers with zero physical presence in the jurisdiction are valid
under the Commerce Clause “so long as [they] (1) appl[y] to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing State, (2) [are] fairly apportioned, (3) do[] not
discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) [are] fairly related to the services the
State provides.” Id. at 2091 (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274,
279 (1977)).
Id. at 2080.
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does not control the result in the Kaestner Trust case. Kaestner Trust is strictly a due
process case. As noted by the Quill court (in a portion not overruled by Wayfair),
challenges to a state tax regime under the Commerce Clause and the Due Process
Clause may be related but are distinct.66 A state’s tax may be consistent with the
Due Process Clause but violate the Commerce Clause, although the reverse is not
true.67 Any tax that violates the Due Process Clause will necessarily will violate the
Commerce Clause, because the lack of due process operates as a per se undue
burden on interstate commerce.68 Thus, in Kaestner Trust, the important question
is whether North Carolina has the “minimum contacts” required by the Due
Process Clause. 69

II.

DUE PROCESS AND STATE INCOME TAXATION OF TRUSTS

The Supreme Court previously has addressed the issue of trust taxation in
Safe Deposit Tr. Co. v. Virginia.70 In that case, Virginia sought to impose an
intangibles tax on a trust sited in Maryland with a Maryland trust company as
trustee.71 The trust had no assets located in the Commonwealth of Virginia,
although the trust’s grantor and two discretionary beneficiaries were domiciled in
Virginia.72 The Court reasoned in the Safe Deposit case that because the trust had
its situs and assets in Maryland, and the beneficiaries were domiciled Virginia,
allowing Virginia to impose a tax on the trust assets would require the Court to
adopt “the irrational view that the same securities were within two states at the same
instant and because of this to uphold a double and oppressive assessment.”73 The
Court did not root its Safe Deposit decision in specific constitutional grounds, but
rather in the more general, basic principles of the Fourteenth Amendment that
limit a state’s ability to tax items only within its jurisdiction or control. 74
Because Kaestner Trust presents as a due process case, the question is what test
will apply in determining whether a state tax system meets the specific
requirements of that portion of the Fourteenth Amendment.75 Limiting its analysis
to Commerce Clause grounds, the Court in Wayfair acknowledged that state tax

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Quill, 504 U.S. at 304.
Id.
Id. at 305–06 (citing Int’l Harvester Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 353).
Kaestner, 2015 WL 1880607, at *9.
Safe Deposit & Tr. Co. v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 (1929).
Id. at 89–91.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 92.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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systems must also meet the requirement of due process principles.76 Indeed, the
Wayfair Court suggested that state income tax nexus for Commerce Clause
purposes should be evaluated under due process principles, and Quill required
some physical presence in the forum state in order for due process to be satisfied.77
Because a corporation is a mere legal construct with no inherent physical
attributes, the Quill Court reasoned that a corporation’s “minimum contacts” must
come in the form of in-state acts or property maintained in the state. 78 Without
minimum contacts, a state could not fairly tax a corporation.79 Because trusts, like
corporations, are creatures of the law, the Quill reasoning as relates to the due
process analysis (undisturbed by Wayfair) should extend to donative trusts as
well.80 Fundamental fairness is the standard by which state income taxation of
trusts should be judged for due process purposes.81
The same issue—determining a corporation’s presence in a jurisdiction—
spurred the development of the Court’s due process jurisprudence in the personal
jurisdiction area, beginning with the foundational case of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.82 The Court in Quill, in a portion of the decision undisturbed by
Wayfair, recognized that International Shoe and its progeny are relevant to the state
tax inquiry because the inquiries into state tax and personal jurisdiction due process
are “comparable.”83 In determining that a corporation could be subject to personal
jurisdiction in a foreign state by virtue of its contacts with that state, the Court in
International Shoe articulated the due process standard commonly known as
the “minimum contacts test.”84 To satisfy due process, the corporation must have
minimum contacts with the state such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”85 By parity of
reasoning, the same “minimum contacts” should extend to the state taxation arena
as well.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2093 (2018) (“When considering
whether a State may levy a tax, Due Process and Commerce Clause standards may not
be identical or coterminous, but there are significant parallels.”).
Id. (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992)
Id.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See Quill, 504 U.S. 298.
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Quill, 504 U.S. at 307–08.
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
Id. The Court in Quill stated “[b]uilding on the seminal case of International
Shoe . . . we have framed the relevant inquiry as whether a defendant had minimum
contacts with the jurisdiction ‘such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice’’” 504 U.S. at 307 (citations
omitted).
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Because a similar inquiry is applied to state taxation, personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence merits further analysis. Personal jurisdiction breaks down into two
types: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.86 States have general
jurisdiction over a defendant individual or corporation when that defendant has a
large degree of contact with that forum state—a corporation that is incorporated in
that state or does business in that state, or a human being who is domiciled in that
state, for example. 87 Thus, the defendant’s operations within a state are so
substantial that it justifies a lawsuit against it “on causes of action [that] arise from
dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”88 States have specific jurisdiction
over a defendant individual or corporation when the degree of contact is minimal,
but the cause of action arises from that isolated contact.89 In either situation, those
contacts must satisfy due process, which calls for an analysis of whether the contacts
between the defendant and the forum are of a quality and nature such that it is fair
and reasonable for the nonresident to be subject to suit there. 90 This analysis is
fairly straight forward in general jurisdiction situations because general jurisdiction
rests upon the premise that because the corporation or individual has substantial
contacts with the forum state and has benefitted from the protections of the forum,
it is not unreasonable to require that the defendant submit to jurisdiction there.
The analysis of specific jurisdiction is more difficult, however, because the
corporation or individual has a more limited connection with the forum state.
Thus, it is more complicated to find contacts between the defendant and the forum
state that do not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The
specific jurisdiction analysis involves balancing the interests of the plaintiff, the
defendant, and the forum state.91
86.
87.
88.
89.

90.
91.

See generally Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)
(finding no general jurisdiction and holding that specific jurisdiction violates due
process).
See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318.
See Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 176 N.E. 2d 761 (1961) (referring
to Illinois legislature’s drafting of the first specific jurisdiction statute). Following the
decision in International Shoe, states began to enact “long-arm” or specific jurisdiction
statutes. See, e.g., id. Generally, an individual or corporation could be amenable to
personal jurisdiction in that state if the cause of action arises out of that individual’s or
corporation’s contact with the forum state. See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (describing the due process limitations of specific
jurisdiction).
Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316–19.
Id. Since the decision in International Shoe, the Supreme Court has tried to refine and
clarify the standard for determining whether due process is satisfied. See generally
McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 298 (1980); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985);
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In cases involving state taxation of trusts, the principal challenge comes from
the fact that a trust is not a traditional legal person; it is neither a human being nor a
corporation. It is an arrangement for holding property that splits legal title and
equitable title.92 The Supreme Court itself has stated that a donative trust is “not a
thing that can be haled into court; legal proceedings involving a trust [are] brought
by or against the trustees in their own name.” 93 A trust does not exist in corporeal
form; there can be no personal jurisdiction over a trustee (the legal owner of trust
property) unless the trustee is present in the jurisdiction.94 For that reason, if a state
seeks to impose tax on the basis of the residence of a contingent beneficiary who
may never receive trust assets, the question is whether the state has the requisite
contacts required under due process to tax the trust.
The requirements for due process would appear to be met in the case of a trust
with a trustee resident or domiciled (as in the case of a human being) or conducting
business (as in the case of a bank or trust company) in a particular state. In Hanson
v. Denckla,95 a resident of Pennsylvania had established a trust in Delaware, naming
a Delaware bank as trustee. The trust grantor then moved to Florida. Shortly
before her death, she changed the beneficiaries of the trust from her children to
her grandchildren. Upon grantor’s death, the remainder of the trust passed to her
grandchildren, the designated beneficiaries. The grantor’s children brought an
action in Florida, alleging that the change of beneficiaries was ineffective, and that
the children were the real beneficiaries of the trust. The Supreme Court of Florida
held that it had property jurisdiction over the trust and that the change indeed had
been ineffective. Yet before the Florida court rendered judgment, the
grandchildren commenced an action in Delaware, seeking to have themselves
declared as the beneficiaries of the trust, which the court granted. In determining
which state—Florida or Delaware—properly had jurisdiction over the trust, the
Supreme Court of the United States held that the trust did not have sufficient
contacts with Florida, and so Florida courts could exercise no jurisdiction over the
trust. The Court explained that the trustee, a trust company, “has no office in
Florida, and transacts no business there. None of the trust assets has ever been held
or administered in Florida, and the record discloses no solicitation of business in

92.
93.
94.
95.

Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burnham v. Superior
Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990); J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd., v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873
(2011); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); BNSF
Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017).
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
Americold Realty Tr. v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1016 (2016).
Id.
Hanson, 357 U.S. 235.
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that state, either in person or by mail.”96 As the Court suggests in Hanson v. Denkla,
the requirements of due process might be met if the trustee conducts substantial
administrative activity in the jurisdiction, or maintains trust assets in the
jurisdiction.97 All of these situations are examples of the trust’s having sufficient
activity within the state, properly becoming subject to personal jurisdiction (and
thus income taxation under the same analysis).
In the case of a trust that specifically invokes the laws of a particular
jurisdiction in naming its situs, the trust properly would be subject to
personal jurisdiction in the forum state (in addition to possibly being subject
to taxation in the jurisdiction where it conducts substantial activity). While the
contacts between the trust and the forum are isolated in the latter case, the cause of
action, or ability to tax, arises out of those contacts. Due process would be satisfied
because the interests of the forum state are very strong when its laws govern the
trust. But the mere residence of potential—not actual—trust beneficiaries in the
state, without additional forms of contact, likely does not rise to the level of activity
that would trigger personal jurisdiction and thus income tax liability. The contacts
between the trust and the forum state would be too tenuous to be of a quality and
nature that it would be fair and reasonable for the trust assets to be taxed by that
state. Taxation would hinge on the possibility that a trustee might make a
discretionary decision to make a distribution from the trust, when the beneficiary
has no control over this decision.

III.

HOW THE SUPREME COURT WILL RULE (AND WHY IT MATTERS)

In light of the minimum contacts requirements of International Shoe,98 the
Supreme Court likely will rule in Kaestner Trust that a state’s taxation of a trust
based solely on a contingent income beneficiary’s residence in that state violates the
Due Process Clause. 99 A discretionary beneficiary’s interest is too speculative to
give rise to the minimum contacts that are required under the reasoning and spirit
of International Shoe.100 Allowing taxation based on the residence of a contingent
beneficiary would eviscerate any common-sense understanding of “minimum
contacts;” it would allow a state to tax on the basis of what might occur, not on the
facts as they are. There would be seemingly no logical limit to the reach of such a
tax system.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251.
Id.
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
See supra note 33.
Id.
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If the Court concludes that North Carolina lacks the ability to tax nonresident
trusts with resident discretionary beneficiaries, then Tennessee also will need
change its law before the already-scheduled phase out in 2021 of that feature of the
tax law. 101 (Tennessee is the only other jurisdiction that taxes trusts based on the
in-state residence of a contingent beneficiary.102) In North Carolina and
Tennessee, government officials should expect that a Supreme Court ruling in
favor of the trustee in Kaestner Trust will trigger a flood of refund requests for tax
years that are still open. Because this may represent a real strain on state budgets, it
is possible that the Court could declare its ruling to be prospective only. There is
nothing to suggest that this is under consideration in Kaestner Trust in particular,
but it is an approach that the Court has taken in other cases.103
Because there is no uniformity among state income taxation of trusts, it is true
that any particular trust may avoid taxation entirely. This might be because
the trust is sited in a jurisdiction without an income tax, or in a jurisdiction
that the trustee ex ante can determine will not impose a tax based on factors
under the trustee’s control such as the trustee’s residence or domicile, where
the trust conducts its administrative and other activity, the location of the trust
situs or the location of the trust assets.104 Therefore jurisdictions that do impose tax
on income actually distributed out to beneficiaries may want to revise their laws as
follows. In the year of the distribution, that state should tax not only distributions
of current income, but any distributions that are attributable to previously
accumulated income, even if the income had been added to trust principal (so as to
avoid the problem of some income escaping taxation entirely by means of an
accounting sleight-of-hand).105 Ultimately, a decision of the Supreme Court in
favor of the trustee in Kaestner Trust may spur states to finally adopt some a
uniform law for trust income taxation to make trust “situs shopping” less attractive,
bringing greater stability to trust drafting and administration.106

101. 2018 Guidance for Tennessee’s Hall Income Tax Return, TENN. DEP’T REVENUE (July 12,
2017), https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/revenue/documents/taxguides/ indincguide.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F3FX-X8L8].
102. See NENNO, supra note 9.
103. See, e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) (making changes to
derivative citizenship rules on a prospective basis only).
104. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
105. This would be similar to the existing tax laws of California, for example. See CAL. REV.
& TAX CODE § 17745 (West 2019).
106. A Multistate Tax Commission took up, but ultimately abandoned for lack of consensus,
a project to create a uniform tax law for trusts and estates. See, e.g., Trusts Work Group,
MULTISTATE TAX COMM’N, http://www.mtc.gov/Uniformity/Project-Teams/TrustsWork-Group [https://perma.cc/F6ZW-3ABX].
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CONCLUSION

Justice Harry Blackmun famously said that he knew he was “in the doghouse”
with the Chief Justice if he received an assignment to write the opinion in a tax
case.107 But Kaestner Trust is no dog of a case. It broadly implicates basic principles
of due process. There are many reasons to allow each state to implement its own
tax (and strong arguments in favor of a more uniform approach), 108 but it would be
fundamentally unfair to require a trust to pay income tax to a jurisdiction solely on
the basis of the residence of a discretionary trust beneficiary who does not actually
receive any trust distributions. Once the beneficiary receives trust income, it is
reasonable in all respects to subject that income to taxation. The Court’s decision in
Kaestner Trust will have lasting impact on the future of due process jurisprudence.
Ultimately, trusts are creatures of legal fiction. They exist because the law
tolerates the idea that it is possible to split legal and equitable title to property.
Trusts are not the inevitable consequence of some right to control property; their
existence reflects the acceptance of the story of split ownership. In the case of trust
law, fiction is already strange enough. State income taxation should hew close
enough to material reality that a trust is taxed only when the trust has some
meaningful connection with the jurisdiction. An accident of fate—such as where a
wholly discretionary beneficiary decides to live—should not trigger income
taxation.

107. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Reading the Tea Leaves of a New Term, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1986, at
B14 (quoting J. Blackmun).
108. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.

